TORTS
HARRY KALVEN, JR.t

he Common Law may well be thought of as the last citadel of
Holmes' greatness. Without being a systematic collector of such
items, one can readily tick off a series of other Holmes' works the
achievement of which appears tarnished to the critical eye of today. The
clear and present danger formula has had both critics and a reduction
in legal status;' the dictum in Commonwealth v. Davis2 as to the proprietary control of a municipality over the use of public parks has happily failed to survive; the dictum in McAuliffe 3 about having a right to
talk politics but no right to be a policeman has looked increasingly like
an oversimplification;4 it now appears that the three generations of
imbeciles of Buck v. Bell5 will neither be forthcoming nor be enough; 6
again the rule in Dempsey v. Chambers7 finding ratification of an agent's
tort so as to create respondeat superior liability has been viewed as
generating anomalous doctrine;8 and it is difficult to find anyone to put
in a good word for the detour limitation on attractive nuisances of the
Britt case; 9 and to top things off, the extraordinary brevity of the opinion
in Eisner v. Macomber 0 has bespoken more a disinterest in the problem
of taxation and the corporation than a mastery of the intricacies of
stock dividends. It was, therefore, daring of Professor Howe not to let
sleeping classics lie, but by his handsome new edition of The Common
Law to put it to the test of contemporary critical appraisal.
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Roth v. United States, 854 U.S.
476 (1957); cf. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv.

1, 9 et seq. See also Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REv.
3 (1962).

2 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895); cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273-89
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
3 McAuliff v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
4 Cf. EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIviL RIGHTS IN TIE UNITED STATES 552 (1952).

5 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
6 Kalven, A Special Corner of Civil Liberties: A Legal View I, N.Y.U.L. REv. 1223,
1234 (1956).
7 154 Mass. 330, 28 N.E. 279 (1891).
8 MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 212 (4th ed. 1952).
9 United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922).

10 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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I have been asked to discuss the essays dealing with tort." In an important sense my vote has already been decisively cast in favor of The
Common Law. In our casebook Professor Gregory and I rated lecture
III of such importance for today that we quoted from it at length on
three different occasions.' 2 Greater praise than that hath no law teacher.
I should like in this comment to outline why lecture III remains so
relevant to contemporary negligence theory, and then to report and
explore a feeling of puzzlement about the way lecture III looks to me
when it is placed back into the full context of Holmes' theorizing about
tort.
But first a word about the style. The point is not that, as we all recognize, Holmes was a great prose stylist; it is rather that there is such daring
reach and grandeur in the casual epigram: "Ignorance is the best of
law reformers."'u "[E]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled
over and being kicked."' 4 "It is something to show that the consistency
5
of a system requires a particular result, but it is not all."' "It [the law]
does not attempt to see men as God sees them, for more than one sufficient reason."' 6 Thus, the writing is refreshingly different from modern
legal commentary; the philosophic idiom places us on high ground indeed. And undoubtedly part of the appeal The Common Law has had
for law men over the years lies in the fact that it succeeds in lending
intellectual status to technical discussions of law.
Lecture IlI, the essay on Trespass and Negligence, has some splendid
virtues for tort teaching and study today. It expresses a generous interest
in underlying liability theory and endorses the quest for coherence in
legal subject matter. As its main business, the essay places into able and
explicit debate17 the competing principles of negligence and strict lias
bility and thus makes possible discussion of Brown v. Kendall' as policy.
And although Holmes has a notable paragraph about the possibilities of
insurance, 19 the special virtue of the essay is that it discusses liability
principles in pre-insurance and pre-risk shifting terms. It provides,
11 The relevant essays are: Lecture I-Early Forms of Liability; Lecture III-Torts.
-Trespass and Negligence; and Lecture IV-Fraud, Malice and Intent. They constitute roughly 20 per cent of the entire text.
12 GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 57-63, 89-91, 116-118 (1959).
13 COMMON LAW 64 (Howe ed. 1963) (hereinafter cited as COMMON LAW).
14 Id. at 7.

15 Id. at 5.
16 Id. at 86.
17 Id. at 63-85.

18 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
19 COMMON LAw 77-78.
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therefore, a needed baseline for measuring the impact of insurance on
liability thinking.
Moreover, there is a superb handling of the issue of discounting the
standard of care for personal shortcomings of the actor. 20 Holmes spells
out a subtle "third opinion" between liability for moral fault and strict
liability. Only those who cannot act at the reasonable man level-only
the Menloves of the world-act at their peril.
Further there is remarkable realism and sophistication about the role
of the jury in a negligence system.21 Whatever the idiom about mixed
questions of law and fact, Holmes is utterly clear about how remarkable
it is that a normative issue, the standard of care, is given to the jury to
legislate. He delineates carefully the de facto control the jury gets over
the law in the ordinary case because there are disputed questions of fact
and because a general verdict procedure is used. Whatever control the
jury gets over the law in such cases is different from the delegating to it
in the negligence case of the job of setting the standard of care, of
deciding how the parties ought to have acted. What is distinctive about
the negligence issue, as Holmes so clearly sees, is that it will go to the
jury legitimately even when there is no dispute of fact. As Holmes explains:
When a case arises in which the standard of conduct, pure
and simple, is submitted to the jury, the explanation is plain.
It is that the court, not entertaining any clear views of public
policy applicable to the matter, derives the rule to be applied
from daily experience, as it has been agreed that the great body
of the law of tort has, been derived. But the court further feels
that it is not itself possessed of sufficient practical experience to
lay down the rule intelligently. It conceives that twelve men
taken from the practical part of the community can aid its
judgment. Therefore it aids its conscience by taking the opinion
of the jury.22
This concern with the jury's role in negligence leads Holmes to the
famous "wrong" prophecy.23 He argued that over time the courts would
slowly take the negligence issue away from the jury and would after "a
temporary surrender" 24 regain control over a domain of law. 25 "The
featureless generality"2 6 of the due care formula would, Holmes pre20 Id. at 85-88.
21 Id. at 88-103.
22 Id. at 98.
23 Id. at 89, 91.
24 Id. at 100.
25 Holmes regarded it "a great part of the law." Id. at 101.
20 Id. at 89.
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dicted, be replaced by the evolution of specific common-law rules as to
the standard of care under given circumstances. In brief, judicial precedent would slowly codify the law of negligence. It matters little that
Holmes was a spectacularly poor prophet in this instance or that; as the
familiar story of the Goodman2 7-Pokora28 sequence shows, he was to be
unsuccessful even as a judge in making his prophecy come true. The
point is that his prediction goes to the heart of any negligence theory
and poses the properly philosophical query of why negligence remains
so uniquely resistant to capture and domestication by legal rule.
Thus lecture III is a very great success. 2 9 Perhaps the final accolade
to its stature is the debt that the writings of Terry, Edgerton, Seavey and
30
James owe to it.
It has truly been the seminal essay on the law of
negligence.
Yet when one goes back to the full Common Law one gets the uneasy
impression that lecture III reads better out of context as a separate
essay than when it is placed in the mainstream of Holmes' theorizing
about tort liability. Holmes' major preoccupations with underlying
theory and with the shift from moral to external standards yield sophisticated and arresting results when applied to negligence. When, in lecture
IV on Fraud, Malice and Intent, he pursues the same points in other
areas of law, fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution and conspiracy,
3
the treatment seems to me doctrinaire, unilluminating and even a little '
foolish.
The difficulty, I suspect, is with his desire to unify law by showing
"that the tendency of law everywhere is to transcend moral and reach
external standards." 32 As we have seen this yields a very subtle sense in
which the negligence system is based on blameworthy conduct; it makes
a first-rate point about the basis of liability. When applied to fraud,
however, the analysis becomes mechanical and strained. It is not true,
we are told, that fraud depends on any moral notions about the intent
to deceive; rather it depends on such external behavior as making a
Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
29 Lecture I on Early Forms of Liability is, it should be noted, also a great success.
The material is charming and the hypothesis about vengeance and deodands is
fascinating.
80 Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference; The Relation of Mental
States to Negligence, 39 HARV. L. Rav. 849 (1926); James, The Nature of Negligence,
3 UTAH L. REv. 275 (1953); James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence
Cases, 16 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1951); Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv.
L. REV. 1 (1927); Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. Rav. 40 (1915).
31 I recognize the disturbing aptness here of the anecdote about Emerson and
Holmes' essay on Plato.
82 Common LAw 107-08; see also id. at 109.
27
28
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statement known to be false to someone known to rely on it. If a man so
acts, Holmes tells us, the law does not care what his private reasons may
have been; it will hold him liable for fraud.3 3 This is undoubtedly a
correct analysis; the puzzle is why Holmes thought the point was worth
making. We feel that time has obscured things and we are missing a
sense of whom and what he was fighting against. Whatever the power of
such analyses in their day to clear the air of ghosts of morality, today the
extreme behaviorism seems either trivial or misleading.
Moreover, as a result we do not get the grand essay on tort liability
across the entire field which lecture III would lead us to expect. Holmes
does not confront seriously the pockets of strict liability found in the
system. He is helpful neither as to Rylands v. Fletcher3 4 nor as to the
basis of liability in defamation.3 5
The essays do not therefore strike the modem ear with uniform charm
and persuasiveness. Holmes appears to have been too much involved
with intellectual issues we can no longer appreciate. We suspect that
the special unifying theme which was for Holmes the great achievement
of the work is its least congenial feature for us today. But the sheer
range of law material covered in its pages, the depth of its historical
inquiry, the flashes of grandeur in its style and the seriousness of its
purpose will continue to make The Common Law welcome and required
reading for those generations of law men who care for the intellectual
heritage of their profession.
33 Id. at 106-09.
34 Id. at 93, 123-26.
35 Id. at 110-12.

